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Despite some progress in economic policy – in macroeconomic stability in the 1980s, 
and in structural reforms in the 1990s – the MENA countries have failed to attract 
foreign direct investments (FDI). This may be due to several factors. In this paper we 
empirically  verify  from  a  panel  of  72  countries  –  among  which  are  8  MENA 
economies  –  that,  during  the  1990s,  the  low  level  of  trade  and  foreign  exchange 
liberalization compared to East Asia and Latin America played a determinant role in 
the low level of total FDI in the MENA economies, particularly in manufacturing. The 
paper  also  highlights  the  role  of  other  factors,  such  as  physical  infrastructure, 
political environment and macroeconomic conditions, in explaining total FDI flows to 
the different regions. These results stress the importance of accelerating the pace of 
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Many  authors  attribute  the  disappointing  growth  and  employment  in  the 
MENA countries to the region’s low-level integration in the world economy (e.g., 
Makdissi et al, 2000; Dasgupta et al, 2003). Excepting oil exports, the region scores 
the second lowest export-to-GDP ratios in the world, after Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
term of FDI, the picture is similar.    
 
The ratio of net FDI flows to GDP reached only 0.9 percent, on average, in the 
1990s, as compared with 2.5 percent in Africa, 3.8 percent in East Asia, and 4.5 
percent in  Latin America (see Figure 1). Moreover, while FDI flows increased in 
other regions during the 1990s, the progression was very small in MENA (6.3 percent 
per year, on average, between the 1980s and the 1990s, as compared with 17 percent 
in Africa, 10 percent in East Asia, 22 percent in Latin America, and 13 percent in 
South Asia). Even though Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen attracted, on average, more 
FDI than the other MENA countries (between 1.6 and 2.1 percent of GDP; see Figure 
2), the overall results for MENA remain disappointing.  
 
Figures 1 and 2.  Net FDI Flows by Region  













Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from 117 countries, in World Development Indicators 
(WDI, 2002).  
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The  region’s  poor  export  and  FDI  performance  has  been  related  to  the 
prolonged  application  of  inward-looking  strategies  based  on  import-substitution 
(Nabli and De Kleine, 2000) – strategies abandoned by a number of countries in other 
regions during the 1980s, as part of their process of economic reform. These countries 
achieved a greater outward orientation, and created a favorable climate for trade and 
investment, by lowering trade barriers, privatizing many industries, and reforming the 
foreign-exchange market. The MENA countries are also implementing some of the 
same reforms, but at a slower pace (Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis, 2004).   
 
Recent economic research has shown that open economies tend to adjust more 
rapidly from primary-intensive to manufactures-intensive exports (Sachs and Warner, 
1995). One study (Sekkat and Varoudakis, 2002) focused specifically on MENA and 
investigated  whether  trade  policy  reforms  can  increase  the  share  of  manufactured 
exports  in  GDP.  The  results  suggest  that  trade  policy  matters  for  the  region’s 
performance. Similar conclusion were reached by Achy and Sekkat (2003), and by 
Nabli  and  Véganzonès-Varoudakis  (2003),  regarding  the  impact  of  exchange  rate 
policy in the MENA countries. 
 
As  far  as  FDI  is  concerned,  Hufbauer  et  al  (1994)  have  shown  that  trade 
liberalization plays a significant and consistent role in the investment stock locations 
of the United States and Japan, and that the size and openness of host countries are 
important determinants of FDI flows. The relationship between FDI flows and the 
exchange rate was examined by Cushman (1985), who found significant reductions in 
U.S. direct investment associated with increases in the current real value of foreign 
exchange, and very strong reductions associated with the expected appreciation of real 
foreign exchange. Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) showed that volatility contributes to 
the internationalization of production. In contrast to the relationship between exports 
and liberalization, no comparable studies (to our knowledge) were conducted for FDI 
inflows to the MENA countries.  
 
Conducting such an investigation is important because the MENA region is 
losing the opportunity of attracting FDI and of benefiting from its effects on growth. 
In this regard, the literature suggests that FDI inflows represent additional resources 
that increase a country’s output and productivity, encourage local investment, and 
stimulate the development and dispersion of technology. This is particularly the case 
in the manufacturing industry. The role of FDI as engine of growth in developing 
countries is supported by the findings of UNCTAD (1992), Blomstrom et al (1992), 
and  De  Gregorio  (1992).  The  role  of  FDI  as  a  catalyst  for  local  investment  was 
investigated by Agosin and Mayer (2000) who found a positive externality from FDI 
to  domestic  investment  in  Asia.  Finally,  Borensztein  et  al  1998  found  a  positive 
impact of  FDI on the development and dispersion of technological skill, provided 
there is enough human capital in the host country.  
 
Given  the  demonstrated  importance  of  FDI  as  an  engine  of  growth,  the 
objective of this paper is to examine whether the reforms undertaken by some MENA 
countries can help improve their ability to attract FDI.  For this purpose, we have 
designed  an  econometric  model  of  the  determinants  of  FDI  –  total  as  well  as  in 
manufacturing.  To highlight the MENA specificity, the empirical analysis involves 
comparisons with Latin America, East and South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
model  includes  traditional  determinants  of  FDI  (such  as  GDP  for  the  size  of  the CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.30 
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country,  GDP  per  capita  for  wealth,  and  GDP  growth  rate  for  future  market 
opportunities); as well as indicators of trade and foreign exchange liberalization. In a 
second step, the model is enlarged to consider other factors that also affect a country’s 
investment climate (human capital, physical infrastructure, political environment and 
macroeconomic conditions). 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the literature. Section 
3 presents the econometric analysis. Section 4 analyses the state of reforms in the 
MENA economies and implications for attracting FDI flows to the region. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
II. Review of the Literature 
II.1. Impact of FDI on the Host Country 
 
In  many  developing  countries,  policymakers  are  very  concerned  with  FDI 
inflows, which are viewed as necessary for improving economic performance. FDI 
inflows  are  expected  to:  (a)  increase  output  and  productivity;  (b)  encourage  local 
investment; and (c) stimulate the development and dispersion of technology. While 
the impact on output and productivity seems to be non-controversial, the others are 
still debated among economists.  
 
By increasing capital stock, FDI is supposed to rise a country’s output and 
productivity  by  promoting  the  more  efficient  use  of  existing  resources,  and  by 
absorbing  unemployed  resources.  A  well-documented  study  by  UNCTAD  (1992) 
lends clear support to the role of FDI as an engine of growth in developing countries – 
a conclusion reached independently by Blomstrom et al (1992). The higher efficiency 
of FDI was also examined empirically by De Gregorio (1992), who used a panel of 12 
Latin  American  countries  to  show  that  the  higher  efficiency  came  from  the 
combination of foreign advanced management skills with domestic labor and inputs,  
and that FDI is about three times more efficient than domestic investment.  
 
FDI  is  also  expected  to  act  as  a  catalyst  for  local  investment  by 
complementing local resources and providing a signal of confidence in investment 
opportunities. The relationship between FDI and domestic investment was examined 
empirically by Agosin and Mayer (2000), who investigated the extent to which FDI 
crowds in or crowds out domestic investment.  In their model, the effects of FDI on 
investment are allowed to differ across countries, depending on domestic policy and 
the nature of FDI inflows (new activities or existing activities), and across sectors 
dependent  on  technology.  FDI  was  expected  to  be  complementary  to  domestic 
investment if it is oriented to high-technology sectors, and to substitute for domestic 
investment  if  it  directly  competes  with  local  firms.  A  testable  version  of  the 
theoretical model was estimated using a panel of 32 countries over the period 1970-
96.  The results suggested the presence of a crowding-out effect (negative externality) 
in Latin America and a crowding-in (positive externality) in Asia.  In Africa, FDI was 
found to increase domestic investment one for one (neutral externality).  These results 
are different from those obtained by Borensztein et al (1998), who found a positive 
but  non-significant  effect  of  FDI  on  domestic  investment  for  a  sample  of  69 
developing countries.   
 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.30 
  6 
FDI  can  stimulate  the  development  and  dispersion  of  technological  skills 
through  transnational  corporations’  internal  transfers,  and  through  linkages  and 
spillovers  among  domestic  firms.  The  recent  growth  literature  has  highlighted  the 
dependence of growth rates on domestic technology catching up to that of the rest of 
the world. Findlay (1978) suggested that foreign direct investment increases the rate 
of technological progress in the host country through a “contagion” effect from the 
more advanced technology, management practices, etc., used by the foreign firms.  
Wang (1990) incorporates this idea into a model in which the increase in knowledge 
applied to production is a function of FDI. On the empirical front, Borensztein et al 
(1998) examined the role of FDI in the process of technology diffusion and economic 
growth in developing countries.  They tested positively the effect of FDI flows on 
economic growth in 69 developing countries through a process of catching up with 
the level of technology of the investing foreign firm. Their results reveal also a strong 
complementarity between FDI and human capital. FDI has an overall positive effect 
on growth, but its magnitude depends on the stock of human capital available in the 
host country. FDI can even have a negative effect on growth in countries with low 
levels of human capital. The results are robust to a set of alternative specifications.  
Borensztein et al (1998) finally indicate that there is a positive, though not highly 
significant, relationship between FDI and domestic investment. 
 
II.2. Determinants of FDI Inflows 
 
The literature puts forward various motivations for FDI. An early analysis by 
Hymer  (1960)  emphasized  the  competitive  advantages  that  the  foreign  firm  may 
obtain relative to host firms, through the use of its intangible assets in research and 
development, and through advertising in the foreign market (Caves, 1971).  Another 
approach focused on the product life cycle hypothesis (Vernon, 1966). In the early 
stage of its life, the product is produced by the innovating company in its domestic 
market.  In the second stage, the company exports to other industrialized countries 
and probably invests in these countries. In the third stage, the product is completely 
standardized,  and  the  rise  of  price  competition  leads  the  company  to  invest  in 
developing  countries  to  get  cheaper  labor.  These  approaches  were  supported 
empirically by various authors (Caves, 1974; Kin and Lyn, 1986; Mansfield et al, 
1979), all of whom found that the advantage of the U.S. multinationals in terms of 
research and development and advertising allowed them to possess monopolistic rents 
over domestic firms. These theories do not explain, however, why leading firms adopt 
FDI rather than trade or licensing, for example. Williamson (1975) provided the most 
convincing  answer  by  showing  that  firms  may  prefer  internationalization  (FDI) 
because market transactions may encounter substantial costs. 
 
While these analyses highlight the benefits of undertaking FDI, the issue of 
choosing a given host country is not completely clarified. The eclectic theory of FDI 
suggests, among other things, that the chosen foreign country must present location 
advantages that make it a more attractive site for FDI than other countries (Dunning, 
1981 and 1988). Given the objective of the study, our literature review focuses on the 
determinants of host country attractiveness.   
 
An  early  survey  by  Agarwal  (1980)  summarized  the  basic  economic 
determinants of country attractiveness with respect to FDI. He suggested three main 
factors: (a) the difference in the rate of return on capital across countries; (b) the CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.30 
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portfolio  diversification  strategy  of  investors;  and  (c)  the  market  size  of  the  host 
country. The difference in the rate of return is dependent on incentives for foreign 
investors and the supply of cheap labor. Empirical evidence, however, shows that 
incentives provided by the host country have only a marginal effect on FDI. Agarwal 
explained  this  unexpected  finding  by  the  fact  that  incentives  are  generally 
accompanied by a set of restrictions and requirements. The supply of cheap labor 
appears to be a more convincing explanation of FDI. Overall, empirical evidence on 
the relationship between inter-country differences in the rates of return and FDI does 
not  provide  any  conclusive  results.  This  ambiguous  finding  is  due,  according  to 
Agarwal, to statistical and conceptual problems. Theoretically, FDI is a function of 
expected  profits,  but  available  data  are  on  reported  profits.  In  addition,  reported 
profits  may  not  be  similar  to  actual  profits,  since  transactions  between  the  parent 
company and its affiliates are subject to intra-company pricing rather than market 
pricing. 
 
The portfolio diversification hypothesis stresses the fact that investors select 
their  locations  taking  into  account  both  expected  profits  and  perceived  risk.  The 
assumption  is  that  portfolio  diversification  helps  reduce  the  total  risk  as  long  as 
returns are highly correlated within the country, and weakly correlated between the 
home and host countries. The empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis remains 
weak. Some authors attempted to understand why multinational companies tend to 
contribute more to FDI than to portfolio investments, when portfolio investments are 
more  likely  to  provide  a  better  instrument  for  geographical  diversification.  They 
argued that this preference might be due either to the absence of organized security 
markets  (the  case  of  developing  countries),  or  to  the  high  inefficiencies  of  these 
markets when they exist. 
 
Finally,  FDI  is  considered  to  be  a  function  of  output  or  sales  in  the  host 
market,  which  is  usually  approximated  by  GDP  or  GNP.  Most  empirical  studies 
reviewed by Agarwal (1980) have lent support to the relationship between FDI and 
the market size of the host countries. This view is, however, challenged by Lucas 
(1993). Focusing on seven East Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore,  South  Korea,  Thailand,  and  Taiwan)  over  the  period  1960-87,  he 
considered two measures of market size – the export market and the domestic market. 
The results revealed a weak relationship between the size of domestic market and the 
volume of  FDI, and a high degree of responsiveness of  FDI to incomes in major 
export markets. This may reflect the outward orientation of foreign firms located in 
this region. FDI inflows were also found to be more responsive to wages in the host 
country than to the cost of capital, including taxes. Allessandrini and Resmini (1999) 
investigated the determinants of FDI inflows in Central and Eastern Europe and in the 
Mediterranean region over the period 1990-97, and got different, and mixed, results. 
For Central and Eastern Europe, the results indicated a significant positive effect of 
market size and openness on FDI decisions, while human capital and the degree of 
industrialization seemed to be negatively related to FDI flows. For the Mediterranean 
region,  the  degree  of  industrialization  and  human  capital    positively  affected  FDI 
flows,  whereas  openness  and  risk  factors  had  a  negative  effect,  and  market  size 
seemed to play an insignificant role. 
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II.3. Trade Policy and FDI 
 
Analyses of the role of economic policy in attracting FDI have historically 
been concerned with commercial, exchange rate, and investment incentive policies, 
the  latter  including  grants,  subsidies,  tax  abatement,  loan  guarantees,  and  interest 
subsidies. Grubert and Mutti (1991) found that incentive schemes designed to attract 
FDI  flows  were  effective  in  altering  foreign  investment  decisions.  Brewer  (1993) 
pointed out that these policies can either increase or decrease market imperfections, 
and  therefore  increase  or  decrease  levels  of  FDI.  He  made  a  distinction  between 
policies that affect FDI directly (capital controls, government transfer pricing policies, 
labor policies, intellectual property laws), and those with indirect effects (monetary 
policies,  including  exchange  rate  management).  Loree  and  Guisinger  (1995) 
suggested  that  the  effect  of  policies  on  FDI  may  differ  between  developing  and 
developed countries. They clearly stated, on the basis on their empirical analysis, that 
raising incentive levels is not an easy way to attract more FDI flows.  
 
Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) examined the effects of liberalization on FDI. 
They showed that trade liberalization and a reduction in investment restrictions have 
different  effects  on  FDI,  depending  on  the  host  country’s  motives  for  wanting  to 
engage  in  FDI.  There  is  the  tariff-jumping  argument,  in  which  trade  and  factor 
mobility are viewed as substitutes. The other view is that the major motive for FDI is 
the exploitation of intangible assets in the host country. Trade liberalization is likely 
to decrease intra-regional FDI flows if the tariff-jumping argument is valid, because 
exporting  from  the  home  country  becomes  more  attractive  than  FDI  as  a  way  of 
serving the regional market. But if the motivation behind FDI is the exploitation of 
intangible  assets,  then  a  reduction  in  trade  barriers  can  enable  multinationals  to 
operate more efficiently across international borders. This is especially the case for 
vertical FDI. The net impact of liberalization is therefore determined by the structure 
and motives for pre-existing investment. 
 
On the empirical side, Hufbauer et al (1994) showed that trade liberalization 
of the host countries plays a significant and consistent role in the investment stock 
decisions of the United States and Japan. The size and openness of the host countries 
are important determinants of FDI flows; but host country policies still play a less role 
than historical patterns, market size, or per capita income. Belderbos (1997) analyzed 
data on Japanese firms in the electronic sector in order to reveal the link between FDI 
and protectionists measures, and in particular to determine whether such measures 
taken  by  the  European  Union  and  the  United  States  have  led  to  Japanese  tariff-
jumping FDI. He uses a logit model that tries to explain a Japanese firm’s decision to 
build a production unit in a given region. The results show that anti-dumping actions 
in the European Union are highly threatening for Japanese exports, and are likely to 
induce tariff-jumping FDI.  Just the beginning of an anti-dumping action is enough to 
induce a Japanese firm to start investing without waiting for the outcome. Thus, tariff 
barriers  appear  to  increase  FDI.  Belderbos  also  found  asymmetric  effects  of  anti-
dumping actions on big and small foreign producers. 
 
Girma et al (1999) looked at the role of trade policy and anti-dumping actions 
in determining the distribution of Japanese FDI inflows across sectors in the United 
Kingdom.  They  used  a  Tobit  model  in  which  the  dependent  variable  was  either 
employment  or  fixed  assets  in  Japanese  subsidiaries  based  in  the  UK.  That  study CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.30 
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found that trade barriers acted as an incentive to Japanese FDI in the UK, mainly due 
to the anti-dumping cases brought against Japan. Anti-dumping cases against other 
countries reduced the level of Japanese FDI – one explanation being that these cases 
helped Japanese exports by penalizing competitors. Girma et al also found evidence 
that Japanese firms are attracted to highly integrated sectors across Europe; and that 
protection appears to be an important factor in determining the increase in Japanese 
FDI.  
 
II.4. Exchange Rate and FDI 
 
An early study by Cushman (1985) analyzed the theoretical effects of real 
exchange rate risk and expectations on direct investment, and then used econometric 
models to test for risk and expected effects on U.S. outflows. The theoretical part of 
the paper considered four types of models with a two-period time frame, where the 
firm implements capital investment in the first period in order to realize profits in a 
future period in which price levels, the nominal exchange rate, and the real exchange 
rate are uncertain. The difference among the four models is that: (a) in the first case, 
the firm sells the output abroad using foreign inputs, and can finance its capital at 
home or abroad; (b) in the second case, the firm produces and sells abroad, exports a 
domestically produced intermediate good to the foreign subsidiary, and finances its 
capital domestically; (c) in the third model, the firm produces and sells domestically, 
imports an intermediate good from its foreign subsidiary, and finances its capital at 
home; and (d) in the fourth model, the firm chooses between capital purchased and 
financed at home, with output for sale in the foreign market, and capital purchased 
abroad but financed at home, with output sold in the foreign country. 
 
The  theoretical  results  showed  that  the  direct  effect  of  risk  (expected  real 
foreign currency appreciation) is to decrease the foreign cost of capital, which in turn 
stimulates direct investment. When the costs of the other inputs are affected, induced 
changes in productivity or in output prices may offset the direct effect. If this happens, 
then direct investment is reduced.  
 
In  the  empirical  part  of  the  models  the  dependent  variable  was  the  FDI 
outflows.  The  explanatory  variables  were  the  stock  of  direct  investment  at  the 
beginning of the period; corporate cash flows in the U.S., lagged by one year; real 
domestic GDP; real foreign GDP; the capital cost at the national level; the capital cost 
at the foreign level; the real exchange rate; a variable anticipating the movements in 
the  real  exchange  rate;  and  two  alternative  measures  for  exchange  rate  risk.  The 
results showed significant decreases in U.S. FDI, linked with increases in the current 
value of foreign exchange. There was also evidence that increases in risk consistently 
raise direct investment.         
 
The relationship between FDI flows and exchange rate was also examined by 
Froot and Stein (1991), using a model in which relative wealth, and therefore, the 
exchange rate, has a systematic effect on FDI. As the domestic currency depreciates, 
the wealth of foreign entrepreneurs rises relative to that of domestic entrepreneurs, so 
that (all else equal) more foreign entrepreneurs undertake foreign investment. The 
empirical  implementation  of  the  model  showed  that  FDI  inflows  are  negatively 
correlated  with  the  value  of  the  dollar.  The  paper  thus  supports  the  claim  that  a CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.30 
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depreciated currency can stimulate in buying control of productive corporate assets 
abroad.  
 
Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) examined the implications for FDI when both 
foreign  demand  and  the  exchange  rate  are  subject  to  random  real  shocks.  They 
assumed risk aversion with a two-period model in which a horizontally integrated 
multinational produces only for the foreign market, using a combination of domestic 
and foreign capacity. During the first period, the firm decides and commits to its 
production capacity in the domestic and foreign plant locations. During the second 
period, uncertainty in exchange rates and demand are resolved, with domestic and 
foreign  affiliates  producing  at  capacity  and  taking  prices  that  clear  the  market. 
Investors repatriate their profits and payments for investment capacity are made.  
 
Empirically in this model, the dependent variable is the FDI outflows with 
respect  to  domestic  investment.  The  explanatory  variables  are  the  lagged  real 
exchange rate volatility; the lagged variability in the real demand of the host country; 
the correlation between the real exchange rate and the lagged real GDP; and the real 
GDP of the host  country. There is evidence that exchange  rate volatility tends to 
stimulate the share of investment activity located abroad. Real depreciation of the host 
country currency was associated with reduced investment shares to foreign markets. 
Finally,  the  study  shows  that  exchange  rate  volatility  can  contribute  to  the 
internationalization of production activity without reducing economic activity in the 
home country.             
 
Finally, Castanaga et al (1998) investigated the impact of economic policy on 
FDI in developing countries using two data sets – the first concerning aggregate FDI 
inflows over the period 1970-95; and the second concerning FDI from the United 
States, by sector of destination, over the period 1983-84.  The study had three main 
findings:    (a)  that  exchange  rate  distortions  (as  measured  by  the  black  market 
premium) in the host country do not appear to have a negative effect on FDI flows; 
(b) that growth expectations exert a strong effect on FDI; and (c) that the corruption 
index seems to be negatively related FDI flows.  
 
III. The Empirical Analysis  
 
III.1. Trade and Foreign Exchange Liberalization  
 
As  shown  above,  previous  empirical  studies  differ  with  respect  to  FDI 
specifications.  The  differences  concern  both  the  variables  to  be  included  in  the 
specification and their definition (nominal versus real measures, and levels versus 
growth rates). A common specification relates nominal FDI to GDP, per capita GDP, 
and  the  growth  rate  of  GDP  (see  UNCTAD,  1998).  Here,  we  adopt  this  basic 
specification,  to  which  we  first  add  indicators  of  trade  and  foreign  exchange 
liberalization:  
   
Log( µ α α α α α + + + + + = Lib RGDP GDPpc GDP FDI 4 3 2 1 0 ) log( ) log( )     (1) 
 
With   FDI:    nominal  FDI   
GDP:     nominal GDP of the host country CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.30 
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GDPpc:  real per capita GDP   
RGDP:   real GDP growth rate of the host country 
Lib:    trade and foreign exchange liberalization indicator 
  µ :    error term. 
 
GDP captures the size of the host country’s internal market. A higher GDP is 
assumed to imply better market opportunity and more attractiveness for FDI ( ) α1 0 > . 
GDPpc is related to the wealth of the resident of the host country and then to demand 
effectiveness.  A  higher  real  GDP  per  capita  is  also  assumed  to  increase  the 
attractiveness for FDI ( ) α2 0 > . The RGDP reflects the dynamism of the host country 
and its future market size. An increase in the growth rate of real GDP characterizes a 
dynamic economy, which may be more attractive for investors ( ) α3 0 > .  
 
Finally, we expect trade and foreign exchange liberalization to contribute to a 
friendly  climate  for  business  and  investment,  and  to  lead  to  more  FDI  inflows 
( ) 0 4 > α .  A  synthetic  indicator  of  trade  and  foreign  exchange  liberalization  is 
provided by Sachs and Warner (1995). This is a dummy variable (S-W) that takes the 
value one for the years during which a country was classified as liberalized, and the 
value zero otherwise. A country is classified as liberalized according to the following 
criteria:  (a)  non-tariff  barriers  covering  less  than  40  percent  of  traded  goods;  (b) 
average tariff rates below 40 percent; (c) a black market premium (BPM) of less than 
20 percent; (d) no extreme controls in the form of taxes, quotas, or state monopolies 
on exports; and (e) the country is not considered a socialist country. 
 
Equation (1) was first estimated using the dummy variable (S-W). We then 
split this indicator into two components, one concerning openness to trade, and the 
other concerning the exchange market.  
 
Trade  openness  measured  as  the  ratio  of  trade  to  GDP  has  been  used 
extensively  in  the  literature.  This  ratio  is  simply  not  appropriate  for  the  case  of 
MENA countries, since several MENA countries have unusually high trade ratios, 
reflecting  in  part    the  nature  of  their  factor  endowment  (oil  in  particular).  We 
therefore use an indicator that corrects for this bias. This indicator is calculated as the 
ratio of imports plus exports to GDP.  From this, we have deducted the “natural trade 
openness” of the economies (Frankel and Romer,(1999),
1 as well as the exports of oil 
and mining products. Thus, the indicator reflects more the trade policy (TPol) of a 
country than the simple trade openness ratio.  
 
Regarding the exchange market, we use the dollar real exchange (RER), its 
volatility  (RERVol),  and  BMP.  The  latter  –  which  is  a  widely  used  measure  of 
distortion in foreign exchange market – as well as RER volatility and appreciation, are 
expected to affect negatively FDI flows.  
 
                                                            
1 The natural openness of an economy takes into account the size and the distance of the markets of the 
countries concerned.  
 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.30 
  12
µ α α α
α α α α α
+ + +
+ + + + + =
) log( ) ( ) log(
) log( ) ( ) log( ) log( ) (
7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
BMP RERVol RER
TPol RGDP GDPpc GDP FDI Log
  (1’) 
 
  Equations (1) and (1’) were estimated using a sample of cross-section and time 
series data. The sample includes annual data from 1990 to 1999 and covers from 48 to 
72 countries (excluding OECD and East European countries; see Annex 1 for the list 
of countries). We used the panel data econometric methodology. Tests of fixed and 
random effects were conducted to select the most adequate models. The estimates are 
heteroskedastic consistent. 
 
Table 1.  Trade and Foreign Exchange Liberalization  
(dependent variable:  logarithm of net FDI) 
 
Specifications  Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 3  Specification 4  Specification 5 
Variables  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat. 
GDP  1.57  (6.95)  2.35  (7.35)  1.90  (4.76)  2.06  (6.23)  1.57  (3.99) 
                     
GDP per capita  1.37  (2.72)  0.06**  (0.08)  0.41**  (0.50)  0.05**  (0.06)  0.79**  (0.90) 
                     
GDP growth  0.01**  (1.33)  0.01**  (1.35)  0.02**  (1.24)  0.01**  (1.19)  0.02**  (1.13) 
                     
Indicator  S-W  0.49  (2.01)                 
                     
Real exchange rate      -0.50**  (-1.64)  -0.28**  (-0.47)  -0.41**  (-1.39)  -0.21**  (-0.36) 
                     
Trade policy      1.00  (2.57)  1.00  (2.18)  0.99  (2.47)  0.99  (2.12) 
                     
Black market prem.          -0.18  (-2.80)      -0.18  (-2.57) 
                     
RER volatility              -0.30  (-2.94)  -0.26  (-2.25) 
                   
Number countries  72  49  48  49  48 
Number obs.  646  434  298  428  295 
AR
2  0.84  0.84  0.83  0.85  0.83 
Fixed effects  F(71,570) = 12.7  F(48,380) = 13.2  F(47,244) = 7.5  F(48,373) = 13.6  F(47,240) = 7.4 
Random effects  CHISQ(3) = 39.1  CHISQ(5) = 45.7  CHISQ(6) = 148.5  CHISQ(5) = 23.4  CHISQ(6) = 16.9 
Note:   Data have been compiled from World Development Indicators (WDI, 2002). 
**:  not significant (probability > 90 percent).   
Source:   Authors’ estimations. 
 
Table 1 reports the estimation results. There are four specifications: the first  
incorporates the Sachs-Warner indicator; and the remaining three include trade policy 
and various combinations of exchange market indicators. The fixed effects and the 
random effects tests support the focus on the fixed effects model.  
 
In specification 1, all the coefficients are significant (except for GDP growth, 
RGDP),  with  the  expected  sign.  This  is  the  case  of  the  coefficient  of  the  Sachs-
Warner indicator of trade and foreign exchange liberalization (S-W), and it indicates 
that  trade  and  foreign  exchange  reforms  increase  total  FDI  inflows.  In  the  other 
specifications, the coefficients of per capita GDP (GDPpc), GDP growth (RGDP), 
and real exchange rate (RER) are never significant, while also having the expected CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.30 
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sign.  In  contrast,  the  coefficients  of  trade  policy  (TPol),  BMP  and  exchange  rate 
volatility (RERVol), are consistently significant across specifications. 
 
 In other words, a high degree of host country trade openness clearly increases 
total FDI inflows. In addition, exchange rate volatility and distortions in the foreign 
exchange  market  have  a  negative  impact  on  total  FDI  inflows.  These  results  are 
consistent with Lucas (1993), who found a high degree of responsiveness of FDI to 
incomes in major export markets for Asian countries, and related it to the outward 
orientation  of  foreign  firms  located  in  that  region.  Note  also  that  Hufbauer  et  al 
(1994) found that the size and trade openness of the host country is an important 
determinant of FDI flows.  
 
III.2. Investment Climate  
 
The results outlined above lend clear support to the hypothesis of positive 
impact of trade and foreign exchange liberalization on total FDI inflows. However, 
international  evidence  (see  Dasgupta  et  al,  2003)  suggest  that  companion  policies 
aimed at strengthening the investment climate would be needed to further increase the 
attractiveness of a country for foreign investment.  
 
First, the availability of adequate human capital can be seen as a necessary 
condition for FDI because of its complementarily with FDI (Borensztein et al, 1998). 
The availability of infrastructure also appears to be an important determinant of FDI 
inflows to developing countries (Wheeler and Mody, 1992). Finally, sound political 
environment and economic policies are encouraging factors for foreign investors, due 
to the role they play in lowering profit uncertainty (Agarwal, 1980; Schneider and 
Frey, 1985).  
 
One can, therefore, wonder whether trade and foreign exchange liberalization 
still play a prominent role in attracting FDI once other determinants are taken into 
account. To disentangle the role of these various determinants, we augmented and re-
estimated equation 1, using separate indicator for each determinant. The indicators 
were then introduced simultaneously (see Equation (2)).  
 
We used the aggregate Sachs and Warner (1995) index of trade and foreign 
exchange liberalization (S-W), and did not introduce a similar split as in Table 1. 
Otherwise  –  given  the  missing  observation  for  exchange  rate  variables  (RER  and 
RERVol) and BMP on the one hand, and for the additional variables on the other hand 
– we would have ended up  with a very limited number of observations.  
 
As an indicator of human capital, we used the secondary school enrollment 
ratio  (Enrol2).  The  number  of  fixed  telephones  phones  per  capita  proxied  the 
availability of infrastructure (Phone). The indicators of  macroeconomic conditions 
and  political  environment  were  drawn  from  the  International  Country  Risk  Guide 
(2000), which assigns a numerical value to a predetermined range of risk components. 
The scale awards the highest value to the lowest risk, and the lowest value to the 
highest risk. The economic risk rating (Eco) provides an assessment of a country’s 
current economic strengths and weaknesses,
2 while the aim of the political risk rating 
                                                            
2 The economic risk rating consists of 5 indicators: GDP per capita, real GDP growth, annual inflation 
rate, budget, and current account balance as a percentage of GDP.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.30 
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(Pol) is to provide a means of assessing the political stability and the good governance 
of a country
3 (see International Country Risk Guide, 2000).  
 
µ α α α α
α α α α α
+ + + +
+ − + + + + =
) ( ) ( ) log( ) 2 log(
) ( ) ( ) log( ) log( ) (
8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
Pol Eco Phone Enrol
W S RGDP GDPpc GDP FDI Log
  (2) 
 
The  estimation  results  are  presented  in  Table  2.  A  first  interesting  result 
concerns the liberalization index (S-W). This variable is always significant (except in 
the  third  specification),
4  and  its  coefficient  level  is  broadly  similar  across 
specifications (between 0.44 and 0.64; see Tables 1 and 2).  
 
When additional determinants of FDI are introduced separately (human capital 
(Enrol2),  fixed  phones  (Phone),  political  environment  (Pol)  and  macroeconomic 
conditions (Eco)), their coefficients are always significant, with the expected positive 
sign.  When  they  are  introduced  simultaneously,  the  coefficient  of  human  capital 
(Enrol2) become insignificant – possibly due to co-linearity.  
 
Table 2.  Trade and Foreign Exchange Liberalization and Business Environment  
 (dependent variable:  logarithm of net FDI) 
Specifications  Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 3  Specification 4  Specification 5 
Variables  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat. 
GDP  1.39  (5.77)  1.04  (3.58)  1.22  (5.00)  1.53  (6.26)  0.75  (2.44) 
                     
GDP per capita  1.12  (2.14)  0.12**  (0.19)  1.10  (2.22)  1.37  (2.66)  0.35**  (0.52) 
                     
GDP growth  0.01**  (1.19)  0.01**  (1.73)  0.00**  (1.03)  0.01**  (1.52)  0.01  (2.23) 
                     
Indicator  S-W  0.64  (2.49)  0.50  (1.99)  0.44**  (1.43)  0.51  (1.71)  0.59  (1.74) 
                     
Education  1.19  (2.24)              0.85**  (1.42) 
                     
Fixed phones      0.79  (3.59)          0.45  (1.90) 
                     
Political Environment          0.03  (4.61)      0.02  (2.24) 
                     
Macroeconomic Conditions              0.03  (1.88)  0.03  (2.31) 
                     
Number countries  70  71  64  63  62 
Number obs.  624  548  572  554  469 
AR
2  0.85  0.87  0.85  0.85  0.87 
Fixed effects  F(69,549) = 13.3  F(70,472) = 12.9  F(63,503) = 13  F(62,486) = 14  F(61,399) = 13.6 
Random effects  CHISQ(4) = 
39.0 
CHISQ(4) = 20.1  CHISQ(4) = 16.7  CHISQ(4) = 35.7  CHISQ(7) = 22.7 
Notes:   Data  have  been  compiled  from  World  Development  Indicators  (WDI,  2002),  and  from 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2000) for political environment and macroeconomic 
conditions.  
**:  not significant (probability > 90 percent).  
                                                            
3 The political risk index consists of 12 indicators: government stability, socioeconomic conditions, 
investment profile, internal and external conflicts, corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, 
law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, bureaucratic quality.  
4 In this case – although positive – the significance level of the coefficient is slightly below 10 percent. 
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Source:  Authors’ estimations. 
 
 
In fact – as a first step of our empirical analysis – we can conclude that the 
impact of trade and foreign exchange liberalization is robust and consistent across 
specifications.  This  impact  is  rather  strong:  one  standard  deviation  of  the  S-W 
indicator leads to an increase of 0.2 point of the log of FDI. Our results also confirm 
that a friendly business climate complements trade and foreign exchange reforms in 
further  attracting  FDI.  This  is  the  case  for  physical  infrastructure  (proxied  by  the 
number of fixed phones per capita), the improvement of which shows a significant 
impact on FDI (one standard deviation leading to an increase of 0.11 point of the log 




III.3. FDI in Manufacturing  
 
In  the  previous  section,  we  have  empirically  validated  the  positive  role  of 
trade and foreign exchange liberalization, as well as of the climate investment, on 
total  FDI  flows  to  the  developing  world.    Since  FDI  in  manufacturing  is  more 
productive than total FDI, it is interesting to ask the question of its determinants.  
 
In  this  section,  we  have  investigated  whether  trade  and  foreign  exchange 
liberalization,  as  well  as  the  investment  climate,  constitute  pertinent  explanatory 
factors  of  a  country’s  attractiveness  in  terms  of  FDI  flows  to  the  manufacturing 
industry.  Equation  (2)  has  been  tested  by  replacing  total  FDI  by  FDI  in 
manufacturing.  
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+ − + + + + = −
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Equation (2’) has been estimated using a sample of 20 to 26 countries from 
1990 to 1999 (see Annex 1 for the list of countries). Due to the lack of information on 
FDI in manufacturing, our sample has been substantially reduced. As before, we used 
panel data econometric techniques.
6  
 
The estimation results are presented in Table 3. As before, the liberalization 
index (S-W) is positive and significant in all specifications. The impact of trade and 
foreign  exchange  liberalization  on  FDI  inflows  (total  and  in  manufacturing)  is 
therefore robust and consistent.  
 
 
                                                            
5 In addition, our estimations show that the coefficients of the control variables (GDP, GDPpc, and 
RGDP) are comparable to those in the first specification in Table 1. Like the latter, only the GDP 
coefficient  is  consistently  significant  across  specification,  but  unlike  it,  the  two  other  coefficients 
became significant in many instances.  
 
6  Half  of  the  tests  for  fixed  or  random-effect  models  concluded  in  favor  of  fixed-effect  models 
(specifications 1, 2, and 6).  However, we always present the results of the fixed-effect model. This is 
justified by the fact that random-effect models are difficult to interpret, and that there is no reason to 
choose such models in our case. Our estimates are heteroskedastic consistent. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.30 
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Table 3.  Trade and Foreign Exchange Liberalization and Business Environment  
(dependent variable: logarithm of net FDI in the manufacturing industry) 
 
Specifications  Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 3  Specification 4  Specification 5  Specification 6 
Variables  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat. 
GDP  1.22  (3.05)  1.33  (3.05)  0.77**  (1.55)  0.24**  (0.55)  1.15  (2.66)  0.48**  (0.74) 
                                   
GDP per capita  1.08**  (1.13)  1.40**  (1.35)  0.47**  (0.36)  1.11**  (1.33)  1.12**  (1.17)  1.41**  (1.07) 
                                   
GDP growth  -0.01**  (0.74)  -0.01**  (1.04)  -0.01**  (0.41)  -0.02**  (1.68)  -0.01**  (0.61)  -0.02**  (1.51) 
                                   
Indicator  S-W  1.04  (2.31)  0.93  (1.98)  1.1  (2.41)  1.09  (2.59)  1.06  (2.27)  0.87  (2.1) 
                                   
Education        0.77**  (0.88)                  -1.36**  (1.56) 
                                   
Fixed phones             0.79  (2.2)             0.21**  (0.55) 
                                   
Political Environment                  0.05  (4.25)      0.05  (3.7) 
                                   
Macroeconomic 
conditions 
                     0.01**  (0.4)  -0.03**  (1.3) 
                                      
Number countries  21  21  21  20  20  20 
Number obs.  148  148  139  144  144  135 
AR
2  0.9  0.9  0.91  0.91  0.89  0.92 
Fixed effects  F(20,123)=18.3 F(20,122)=18.2 F(20,113) = 19.4 F(19,119) = 18.2 F(19,119) = 18.2 F(19,107)= 19.2 




CHISQ(4) = 0.65  CHISQ(4) = 4.7  CHISQ(4) = 6.0  CHISQ(4) = 
8.3** 
Notes:   Data  have  been  compiled from  World  Development  Indicators  (WDI,  2002);  from  United 
Nation  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD,  various issues)  for  FDI  in  the 
manufacturing  industry;  and  from  International  Country  Risk  Guide  (ICRG,  2000)  for 
political environment and macroeconomic conditions.  
**:  not significant (probability > 90 percent).  
Source:  Authors’ estimations 
 
Another important findings consists in the magnitude of the coefficient of the 
liberalization index. This coefficient is almost double than of the case of total FDI 
(0.9 to 1.1, compared to 0.44 to 0.64). This means that one standard deviation of this 
variable leads to an increase of 0.5 to 0.7 point of the log of FDI. This makes trade 
and  foreign  exchange  liberalization  an  even  more  important  factor  for  the 
attractiveness of a country, as far as more productive FDI is concerned. This can be 
justified by the fact that trade and foreign exchange liberalization introduces more 
competition,  provides  more  market  opportunities,  and  allows  for  more  technology 
transfers. These conditions can be considered good incentives for the manufacturing 
sector to invest – especially when investment is export oriented.  
 
When additional determinants of FDI are introduced separately in the equation 
(human  capital  (Enrol2),  fixed  phones  (Phone),  political  environment  (Pol),  and 
macroeconomic conditions (Eco)), their coefficients have the expected positive sign 
but  are  not  always  significant.  This  is  the  case  for  education  (Enrol2)  and  for 
macroeconomic  conditions  (Eco).  When  these  indicators  are  introduced CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.30 
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In summary, the estimation of the determinants of FDI in the manufacturing 
industry has been shown to be more difficult than the estimation of total FDI. Some 
results, however, seem robust. This is the case for the size of the market (which gives 
foreign  investors  a  positive  signal  to  invest  in  a  country);  for  trade  and  foreign 
exchange liberalization (which always has a significant impact on FDI flows); and for 
the political environment. These are interesting findings that should not be neglected 
if a country wants to attract more productive FDI. 
 
Other  factors  –  such  as  education,  core  infrastructure,  or  macroeconomic 
condition – could also have played a significant role in attracting more productive 
FDI.  The  small  size  of  our  sample,  however,  and  the  focus  on  FDI  in  the 
manufacturing  industry,  must  explain  the  difficulties  in  estimating  Equation  (2’). 
These other factors should, nevertheless, be considered carefully when implementing 
the reform agenda of the MENA countries.  
 
IV.  Trade  and  Foreign  Exchange  Liberalization  and  the 
Investment Climate in the MENA Countries  
 
In this section, we use the econometric framework developed above to explain 
the low attractiveness of the MENA countries as far as FDI is concerned. We work 
with a sample of 72 countries (see Annex 1 for the list of countries). We first present 
the FDI flows toward the different regions of this sample (see Figure 3). We then 
discuss the state of reforms in the MENA countries. This allows us to quantify the 
deficit in FDI due to the lack of reform of these economies.  
 
Actually, it can be noticed – when  comparing Figure 1 in the introduction 
with Figure 3 below – that using our sample of 72 countries underestimates the FDI 
flows to Africa (especially during the 1990s), as well as to Latin America. However, 
due to missing values for some explanatory variables, the rest of the paper is based on 
this reduced sample of 72 countries.  
 













Source: Authors’ calculations, based on World Development Indicators (WDI, 2002) for 72 countries. 
                                                            
7 In addition, the coefficients of GDP have the expected sign, but are only significant in half of the 
cases (specifications 1, 2, and 5). GDP per capita (GDPpc) and GDP growth rate (RGDP) are never 
significant.  
 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.30 
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Makdissi  et  al  (2000),  Dasgupta  et  al  (2003),  and  Nabli  and  Véganzonès-
Varoudakis (2004) have shown that – although some reforms have been undertaken 
by the majority of MENA countries – these reforms have generally been insufficient. 
This is the case for trade and foreign exchange liberalization, which can be assessed 
through the S-W index. While trade and foreign exchange liberalization in MENA has 
been  more  effective  than  in  Africa,  it  has  most  of  the  time  lagged  behind  Latin 
America and East Asia (see Figure 5). Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and Yemen are the 
exception. In fact, these countries have made a real effort since the beginning of the 
1980s, which led in the 1990s to a very satisfactory level of liberalization compared to 
other MENA economies (see Figure 6).  
 
















Note:   The Sachs and Warner indicator (S-W) is a dummy variable, the value of which is 1 in the case 
of a certain level of trade and foreign exchange liberalization, and 0 if this level is not reached. 
(see Section 3.1 for the exact definition).  In Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and Syria, the level has not 
been reached; thus, the S-W indicator has the value of 0 during the entire period. 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Sachs and Warner (1995).
  
 
Nevertheless, the overall deficit in trade and foreign exchange reforms has 
contributed to the low attractiveness of MENA in terms of FDI. It can be calculated 
from Equation (2) (specification 5) that FDI flows to the region could have been 13 
percent higher during the 1990s, if MENA had undertaken a level of liberalization 
equivalent to that of East Asia. In Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and Syria, due to a low level 
of reforms, this increase could have been higher (42 percent; see Table 4). These 
figures  highlight  the  contribution  of  the  deficit  in  trade  and  foreign  exchange 
liberalization to the low attractiveness of the MENA economies.   
 
The impact of trade and foreign exchange liberalization is even stronger in the 
case of FDI in the manufacturing sector (see Table 3, Section 3.3). These flows have 
been substantial in East Asia, where trade and foreign exchange reforms have been 
significant (see Figure 7). In fact, if MENA had undertaken the same level of reforms, 
FDI in manufacturing could have been increased by almost 20 percent.   
 
The same conclusions can be drawn for physical infrastructure (proxied by the 
number  of  fixed  phones).  Here,  the  gap  with  East  Asia  explains  significantly  the 
deficit  in  FDI  flows  to  the  region.  In  the  1990s,  if  MENA  had  increased  its 
infrastructure to the level of East Asia, FDI flows to the region would have improved CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.30 
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by 26 percent. This percentage could have been even higher in the case of Yemen (54 
percent), Morocco (34 percent), Algeria (32 percent), and Egypt (30 percent), these 
countries having been charaterized by a low development in physical infrastructure 
(see Table 4 and Figures 8 and 9).   
 












Note:   Morocco and Tunisia are the only two MENA countries for which data were available. Their 
average of total  FDI and of FDI in manufacturing is higher than the MENA average  
Source:    Authors’  calculations,  based  on  United  Nation  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development 
(UNCTAD, various issues), for 26 countries (see Annex 1). 
 











Source:  Authors’ calculations from World Development Indicators (WDI, 2002) for 72 countries. 
 
Finally,  the  deficiencies  in  the  political  environment  and  the  economic 
conditions of the MENA countries have also participated in the low attractiveness of 
the region. This has been the case for Yemen, Algeria, and to a lesser extent, Iran and 
Syria. These countries could have benefited from higher  FDI  flows, which would 
have resulted in a 60 percent increase in FDI in Algeria, 50 percent in Yemen, 32 
percent in Iran, and 25 percent in Syria (see Table 4).  
 
Globally, if all these factors were improved at the same time, the region’s 
attractiveness could have been raised by 65 percent. In this case, FDI flows could 
have reached 2 percent  of GDP instead of 1.2  percent. As seen previously, some 
countries that have lagged behind in terms of reforms would have benefited even 
more from a higher level of reforms. Attractiveness to FDI could have increased by 
138 percent in Algeria, about 100 percent in Yemen and Egypt, 89 percent in Iran, and 
71 percent in Syria (see Table 4). 
 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.30 
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It can, however, be noticed that efforts to reform the economy have globally 
paid off less in MENA than in some other regions – East Asia, in particular. In fact, 
MENA  is  characterized  by  unexplained  factors  (such  as  characteristics  of  the 
production function or resource endowments) that are embodied in the fixed effects of 
the  regression,  and  that  participate  in  lowering  the  FDI  flows  to  the  region.  This 
negative impact has been strong in Iran, which has, in addition, been characterized by 
insufficient  reforms.  But  this  factor  also  explains  that  FDI  flows  to  Jordan  and 
Morocco  have  been  disappointing,  despite  good  policies  compared  to  the  MENA 
average (see Table 4).  
 
Actually, if MENA had, in addition to reforms, benefited from the same fixed 
effects  as  East  Asia,  then  FDI  flows  to  the  two  regions  would  have  been  rather 
similar. These flows would have even been stronger in the case Jordan, Morocco, and 
Tunisia. This result should not hide, as shown previously, the significance and the 
payback of reforms in attracting foreign investors. This is an important message to 
policymakers, which should not be forgotten when implementing the reform agenda 
of the MENA economies 
 
Table 4.  Net FDI Flows to GDP in the 1990s (percent) 
 
  Actual       Increase (%)   with  improvement  in  Tot   Potential  F.Effects Potential with 
      T & FE Reform Infrast.  Eco. Stab.  Pol. Stab.            F. Effects 
Algeria  0.3  42  32  23  40  138  0.8      
Egypt  1.3  42  30  9  16  97  2.5  -4.0  3.1 
Iran  0.03  42  15  19  13  89  0.1  -8.6  0.2 
Jordan  1.2  0  22  5  8  35  1.6  -6.4  5.1 
Morocco  1.6  13  34  8  7  61  2.6  -5.4  5.7 
Syria  0.9  42  16  15  10  83  1.6  -4.6  2.6 
Tunisia  2.1  36  26  7  2  71  3.6  -4.6  5.8 
Yemen  2.0  0  54  28  19  101  4.0  -2.3  1.5 
MENA  1.2  13  26  12  14  65  2.0  -5.1  3.9 
E-Asia  4.2                    -3.5    
Source:  Authors’ calculations, based on econometric results 
 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we have shown, for a panel of 26 to 72 countries studied during 
the 1990s, that trade and foreign exchange liberalization constitutes a key factor for 
the attractiveness of a country in terms of FDI. This result is robust regardless the type 
of  FDI  (total  or  in  manufacturing);  the  indicator  of  trade  and  foreign  exchange 
liberalization; and the specification used. The addition of variables of the investment 
climate – such as human capital, physical infrastructure, political environment and 
macroeconomic conditions –  reinforces our findings.  
 
Our results extend the conclusions of various authors on the determinants of 
FDI. In particular, they confirm and enlarge the role of trade and foreign exchange 
liberalization – see Hufbauer et al. (1994) in the case of trade openness; and Cushman 
(1986) and Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) for the real exchange rate. Our findings also 
validate the role of non-traditional determinants of  FDI – such as investment climate 
–  which have not been systematically taken into consideration up to now.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.30 
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As far as  MENA is concerned, the weak  FDI  record of the region can be 
explained by the lack of economic reforms. This is the case for trade and foreign 
exchange  liberalization,  which  –  despite  some  progress  in  the  1990s  –  has  been 
insufficient  compared  to  the  more  successful  economies  of  East  Asia  and  Latin 
America. Actually, the deficit in reforms has constituted a real obstacle for foreign 
investors in countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and Syria. This obstacle has been 
even higher for foreign investment in manufacturing. Even if some economies, such 
as Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and Yemen can be considered leaders in the field of 
trade  and  foreign  exchange  reforms,  progress  needs  to  be  made  by  other  MENA 
countries if they want to attract more FDI. 
 
The same conclusions can be drawn for physical infrastructure, for which the 
gap compared to East Asia has contributed to the deficit in FDI flows to the region.  
All MENA countries need to make a substantial effort to improve their infrastructure 
endowment.  Algeria,  Egypt,  Yemen,  and  Morocco,  however,  have  to  pay  special 
attention to their deficit in infrastructure, if these countries want to catch up with more 
advanced  economies.  Similarly,  progress  in  the  political  environment  and  the 
macroeconomic conditions would have substantially increased FDI flows to Algeria, 
Yemen,  Iran,  and  Syria.  Actually,  FDI  flows  to  MENA  could  have  significantly 
increased, and reached 2 percent of GDP (compared to 1.2 percent), if all of these 
factors  –  trade  and  foreign  exchange  liberalization,  development  of  infrastructure, 
political  environment  and  macroeconomic  conditions  –  had  improved  at  the  same 
time. However, this still would have been inferior to what was achieved in East Asia 
(4.2 percent of GDP).  
 
All of this being said, it is the unexplained factors (embodied in the fixed 
effects of the regression) that cause the payoff of reforms to be lower in MENA than 
in  East  Asia.  This  has  been  particularly  the  case  of  Jordan  and  Morocco,  where 
reforms did not materialize into high FDI flows. In Algeria and Iran, reforms would 
have  suffered  from  even  more  negative  unexplained  factors.  These  negative  fixed 
effects constitute a serious handicap for the region. They imply that efforts to reform 
the economy need to be stronger in MENA compared to other regions, particularly 
East Asia, if MENA wants to attract more FDI. This should not be forgotten when 
implementing the reform agenda of the MENA countries.   
 
Finally,  even  if  education  does  not  seem  to  have  played  a  clear  role  in 
attracting  FDI  flows,  this  factor  should  be  considered  carefully  because  of  its 
importance  in  explaining  the  growth  performances  of  the  region  (see  Nabli  and 
Véganzonès-Varoudakis, 2004).  
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List of Countries in Our Various Samples 
 
  Country   Sample 72  Sample 49  Sample 48  Sample 26 
  Angola  Y       
  Argentina  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Bangladesh  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Benin  Y       
  Bolivia  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Botswana  Y  Y  Y   
  Brazil  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Burkina Faso  Y  Y  Y   
  Cameroon  Y  Y  Y   
  Central African 
Republic 
Y       
  Chad  Y       
  Chile  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  China  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Colombia  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Congo, Rep.  Y       
  Costa Rica  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Cote d'Ivoire  Y  Y  Y   
  Cyprus  Y       
  Dominican Republic  Y       
  Ecuador  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Egypt  Y  Y  Y   
  El Salvador  Y  Y  Y   
  Ethiopia  Y      Y 
  Gabon  Y       
  Gambia  Y  Y  Y   
  Ghana  Y  Y  Y   
  Guatemala  Y  Y  Y   
  Guinea  Y       
  Guinea-Bissau  Y       
  Haiti  Y       
  Honduras  Y       
  India  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Indonesia  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Iran.  Y  Y  Y   
  Israel  Y  Y  Y   
  Jamaica  Y       
  Jordan  Y  Y  Y   
  Kenya  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Kuwait    Y  Y   CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.30 
  26
  Madagascar  Y  Y  Y   
  Malawi  Y  Y  Y   
  Malaysia  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Mali  Y       
  Mauritania  Y       
  Mauritius  Y  Y  Y   
  Morocco  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Mozambique  Y  Y  Y   
  Nepal  Y       
  Nicaragua  Y       
  Niger  Y  Y  Y   
  Nigeria  Y  Y  Y   
  Pakistan  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Papua New Guinea  Y       
  Paraguay  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Peru  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Philippines  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Rwanda  Y       
  Senegal  Y  Y  Y   
  Sierra Leone  Y       
  Singapore  Y  Y    Y 
  South Africa  Y  Y  Y   
  Sri Lanka  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Syria  Y  Y  Y   
  Tanzania  Y  Y  Y   
  Thailand  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Togo  Y  Y  Y   
  Tunisia  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Turkey  Y       
  Uruguay  Y  Y  Y   
  Venezuela  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Yemen, Rep.  Y       
  Zambia  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Zimbabwe  Y      Y 
 
  